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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a civil action brought by Plaintiffs for the recovery of earnest money 
related to the attempted joint venture and sale of certain real property located in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah from which this 
appeal arises, is based on UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(1) (1953, as amended). 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article 
VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1995 
Supp.) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case was poured over to the 
Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on May 15, 1997. 
Partial summary judgment, from which Overland Development Corp. ("Overland") appeals 
was entered by the trial court on June 23, 1995 and the Order Denying Defendants' Motion to 
Reconsider the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment was entered on October 17,1996. A final 
judgment was entered on December 17,1996, Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed with the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, on January 2,1997 and an Amended Notice of Appeal was 
filed on January 13, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was it error for the trial court to rule that Overland was obligated to pay the second 
$15,000, even though it had never requested that the contract be extended and had in fact given 
notice to the Brunettis that it no longer wished to pursue the development of the Property under the 
terms of the contract? 
1 
2. Was it error for the trial court to rule that the first $ 15,000 was due and payable in 
light of express language in the contract that such funds were only payable upon closing of a 
construction loan or if additional time was needed, when Overland never requested additional time 
and the construction loan related to the Property did not close, and when Plaintiffs refused to enter 
into the joint venture with Overland? 
3. Was it error for the trial court to rule that the Brunettis didnot breach the contract by 
refusing to enter into a joint venture with Overland? 
4. Was it error for the trial court to rule that the contract is unambiguous? 
5. Was it error for the trial court to rule that there was a meeting of the minds, and that 
there were no material issues of fact concerning the joint venture? 
These issues have been preserved in the trial court record in Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record (hereinafter "R.") 137-
170); Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Reconsider Entry 
of Partial Summary Judgment (R. 562-599); the April 11, 1995 and April 21, 1995 hearings on the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 843-886) and (R. 887-927); and the 
July 1, 1996 hearing on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration (R. 948-978). 
Standard of Review: The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the Plaintiffs 
on their breach of contract claim. Because entitlement to summary judgment, or not, is a question 
of law, the Utah Court Appeals accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues 
presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). This Court determines 
"only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly 
2 
held that there were not disputed issues of material fact." State v. Ferre. 784 P.2d 14C). 151 (\ lah 
1989). With regard to the issues involving interpretation of the contract, ..n, court reviews the n ,a. 
1 % u
 - . i». ' *•'. *ernretation n particular 
weight. Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985V 
:y/i;v.,.. . STATEMENT Of I HE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This lawsuit centered around the sale and joint venture of a piece of property located at 
approximately 1 4oi tli T smple i -. ' 
(the "Property"). The letter agreement between the parties was not on a commonly used form and 
referred to a somewhat unique arrangement between the parties under which the parties were to enter 
^ <4i>m> s jl seller was to be paid for the Property at 
the time the joint venture obtained a construction loan and no provision was made for an earnest 
money deposit becoming non-refundable unless or - » = O I U K I J I . 
beyond the original period of the agreement. There are factual disputes as to the parties' intent with 
respect to whether there was a joint \ enture (with the sellers expressly stating that they never 
earnest money deposit, and as to what the essence of the transaction was. Despite numerous factual 
issues with respect to these matters, summary judgment was granted in fan or :>f the Plaintiffs 
Maintiffs listed the Property for sale with their agent, Gilbert Turner 
("Turner") Overland, was interested in the Property and, on April 6, 1990, made an offer 
3 
the development of the property. On April 26, 1990, Plaintiffs made a counteroffer to which 
Overland responded with its counteroffer on May 7, 1990. Also, on May 7, 1990, Overland 
delivered an earnest money check to Plaintiffs' agent, Turner, with written instructions that the check 
was not to be deposited pending written notification by Overland. Overland's counteroffer was 
accepted on May 9, 1990, completing the agreement between the parties (the "Agreement"). 
Overland spent a great deal of time and money attempting to get the proper zoning change 
necessary to develop the Property. However, due to the fact that Overland could not acquire proper 
zoning, Overland elected not to proceed with the development of the Property under the original 
terms of the Agreement. Therefore, on August 25,1990, Overland proposed a different arrangement. 
This arrangement was not agreed to by Plaintiffs and, since the parties could not arrive at a 
subsequent agreement, the original Agreement terminated. Overland then requested return of the 
undeposited earnest money check, and Plaintiffs' agent, Turner, returned the earnest money to 
Overland. 
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that they were entitled to the earnest money based upon 
Defendants' alleged breach of Agreement. In the suit, Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against 
Overland and Holman, Overland's principal stockholder, for fraud, breach of contract, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith, equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs 
and Defendants Holman and Overland brought Motions for Summary Judgment. Based upon these 
Motions, and the oral argument addressing these Motions, on June 23, 1995, the Court entered 
partial summary judgment against Overland for breach of contract. In particular, the trial court 
found that the Agreement between the Plaintiffs and Overland, embodied in the April 6, 1990 
4 
Overland letter, as modified by the May 7, 1990 counteroffer, was clear and unambiguous, and 
required Overland to deliver to Plaintiffs the first $15,000 earnest money on September 7, 1990, and 
judgment motions, that Overland's letter of August 25, 1992 constituted a request for additional time 
to close on the purchase of the Property stimulating the payment of the second $15,000 amount. 
lii.il i i ( l i ,n I Hi I ()verland did not p.;iy the required earnest money payments and that the 
Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to a judgment against Overland for $30,000 plus interest from 
November 
Court vacate. 
At the same time, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Overland and 
111»11; 111 i 11 t i i s n 11 s s i i i (.• 1 ' 111 i 11 i i 11 •.' i" 1«11 t ' md dismissed 
all other claims against Holman with the exception of a fraud claim, which remained for trial, as did 
a fraud claim and a breach of the convent of good faith and fair dealing agaii:.. * ^ ^ i» v 
w as the ti tried beginning on August 23, 1995 and, after being continued, ending on November 17, 
1995. After full presentation of all the evidence, the trial court, granted a Motion to Dismiss by 
(hcilaiid I loliiiiun iiiiiill Il iiiiiiLii li in il in in1, llliiiiiiill mini ol lln IVIt/mliinl > IrunJI mmlc HI misrepivsuitnli in I 
Plaintiffs, defrauded Plaintiffs or breached the covenant of good faith or fair dealing. The trial court 
specifically found that Iurner was Plaintiffs' agent and that Iurner had ^LL\: ... riamin. 
i n l t ' t v -
The trial court's entry of partial summary judgment against Overland should be reversed and 
the case remanded for a:. - . . . - ^ .. Mg.i-'i.: i UU-I-NM- • •> \\ * 
5 
fact with regard to whether there was ever a meeting of the minds between the parties on whether 
the Agreement calls for the earnest money to be forfeited and, if so, under what circumstance and 
when the earnest money would be forfeited, the terms of the joint venture agreement between the 
parties or whether the Plaintiffs ever intended to enter into that joint venture, and how the earnest 
money related to the joint venture. Because of these questions of fact, there was not a meeting of 
the minds between the parties sufficient to establish a binding contract giving rise to forfeiture of the 
earnest money. Also, it is evident based upon the documents and testimony that Overland never 
requested an extension to the contract period. Thus, with respect to the second $15,000, there can 
be no dispute that it never became due and payable. Overland therefore requests that this Court 
reverse the trial courts entry of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and remand this 
matter for a short trial on whether there was ever an enforceable contract between the parties. 
Overland further requests that in remanding this matter this Court instruct the trial court enter partial 
summary judgment in Overland's favor, finding that Plaintiffs never became entitled to the 
second $15,000. 
DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
The trial court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' 
Motion"), finding that Plaintiffs were entitled to both the original $15,000 and the second $15,000 
based upon Plaintiffs' theory of breach of contract. It is from this ruling that Overland appeals.1 
1
 Prior to the entry of the final judgment, Overland filed a Motion for Reconsideration of trial court's grant 
of Summary Judgment. This motion was denied, and a final judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' remaining claims 
was entered on December 17, 1996 after a trial on the merits. 
6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs were the owners of a parcel of land at approximately North Temple and 
2. In late 1989 or early 1990, Plaintiffs entered into ..; i agreement with Turner whereby 
Turner agreed to act as Plaintiffs' real estate agent to find a buyer for the Property II 11 '! an 
3. Oil !"!l1 pi il 6 1990. , 0 i- erland made an offer in writing regarding the Property. R. i i /, 
a true and correct copy of Overland's April 6, 1990 offer is set forth in the Addendum as 
Exhibit <4A." 
4* Of particular importance are the terms of this offer, terms which were never deleted 
in the subsequent counteroffers. They are: 
a* A $15,000 earnest money would be deposited in 
an independent trust account to be credited to the 
purchase price at the time of closing with the 
balance paid from the proceeds of the construction 
l oan . • • 
b. Overland would then enter into a joint venture with the 
landowner, within two weeks, to develop the property. 
### 
• . c. Fhe benefit of a joint venture relationship of this type is that 
it enables the developer to use its limited resources on the 
development of the property instead of the purchase of the 
land. This also reduces some of the risk to the developer and 
gives assurance that the project can be consummated before 
the expiration of the agreement. 
7 
See, Exhibit A. Thus, the time at which the earnest money became payable and the need for a joint 
venture between Plaintiffs and Overland were integral provisions of the offer. R. 566-67, 587-88 
and 609. 
5. In fact, without the joint venture agreement between the parties, Overland would not 
have agreed to purchase the Property. Further, Overland believed that the earnest money was not 
payable unless and until the Property closed or Overland requested an extension of time under the 
original agreement. Had this not been the case, Overland would not have agreed to purchase the 
Property. R. 174 and 609. 
6. However, the Brunettis testified that they never agreed nor intended to enter into a 
joint venture with Overland. R. 648-49 and 994-95. At trial Mr. Brunetti stated: 
Q. (By Paul Van Dam) Do you remember telling Mr. Turner that 
you would not enter into a joint venture agreement with Mr. 
Holman and his corporation? 
A. (By Mr. Brunetti) Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember when that was? 
A. That was right at first.. . . 
R. 944-45. In his deposition, Mr. Brunetti stated: 
Q. (By Richard Rappaport) Did you ever tell Mr. Turner that 
you would not enter into a joint venture agreement with 
Overland Development? 
A. (By Mr. Brunetti) Yes. 
O. When was that? 
8 
A. I can' t remember at this time. All I wanted was my money. I was not going 
to be in joint venture with them. 
May 12 ,1993 , deposition of Joseph Brunetti, page 89 lines 6-14; a true and correct copy of the 
relevant pages of Mr. Brunetti's Ma) 12, 1993, deposition are attached hereto in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "B". In her deposition, Mrs. Brunetti stated: 
Q ^gy Richard Rapp a p 0 r t ) Had ;; : it i =i: < er 1: z e iti i * illing to sign, a jc: int > e iiti n e 
agreement with Overland? 
A. (By Mrs. Brunetti) No. 
May 3,1994^ deposition of Florence Brunetti, page 19 lines , ue and c u n a i 
the relevant pages of Mrs. Brunetti's May 3 ,1994 deposition attached hereto in the Addendum 
as Exhibit "C". Plaintiffs simply believed that they were going to sell their land. R. 649. However 
R. 589; a true and correct copy of the Brunettis' April 26 ,1990 counteroffer is attached hereto 
in the Addendum as Exhibit "D". 
7. p ] - v believed that the first $ 15,000 earnest money was 
payable regardless of whether the sale of the Property closed. R. 120. However, Overland believed 
1..1. ..^ Hi's; " , . - ..v became payable ill linn 'ur'i ii ill iinig mi III i islnulmn I in mi 
Overland requested an extension of time past the initial 120 day period. R. 174. Therefore, there 
was no meeting of the minds with regard to financial terms of the contract. 
8. \ ft . . . • ; . . . ^ Plaintiffs submitted a 
counteroffer. In this counteroffer, besides adjusting the sales price, Plaintiffs stated: 
9 
The initial contract term shall be for 90 days. Should additional 
time be required, the developer agrees to release the original 
$15,000 earnest money to seller and replace it with another 
$15,000 non-refiindable earnest money for an additional 60 days." 
R. 118,139,172 and 589; see also, Exhibit D. 
9. Importantly, Plaintiffs did not reject or counter with respect to the offer to enter 
into a joint venture or with regard to the time when the initial earnest money became payable, nor 
did the Agreement state that the earnest money was to be forfeited. See, Exhibit D. 
10. In response to Plaintiffs' counteroffer, on May 7,1990, Overland changed the term of 
the Agreement to 120 days rather than 90 days. R. 172, 590 and 647; a true and correct copy of 
Overland's counteroffer to Plaintiffs9 counteroffer is attached hereto in the Addendum as 
Exhibit "E". No changes were made concerning the joint venture or the time in which the original 
earnest money became payable. Overland's counteroffer to Plaintiffs' counteroffer was accepted by 
the Plaintiffs as evidenced by their initials on the requested 120-day change. R. 172, 568 and 590; 
see also, Exhibit E. 
11. With the counteroffer, on May 7, 1990, Overland delivered to Turner, Plaintiffs' 
agent, a check for $15,000 as earnest money for the purchase and development of the Property. The 
check was never deposited. R. 173 and 594. 
12. Thereafter, the parties attempted to get the Property rezoned to allow commercial 
development. R. 173. 
10 
13. However, by August 25,1990, it became apparent that Salt Lake City was not willing 
to rezone the Property under the proposed plan. Therefore, on that date, Overland sent a letter to 
Plaintiffs. R. 173. That letter states: 
On May 9, 1990, you and your wife, Florence, accepted 
an offer I made to purchase five (+ or -) acres located on 
North Temple near Redwood Road for $895,000. The 
agreement gave me 120 days to complete the sale. If I 
needed additional time I would be required to release the 
original $15,000 Earnest Money deposit to you and pay 
an additional $15,000 non-refundable Earnest Money for 
an additional 60-day extension. September 6, 1990 will 
be the 120th day since our agreement was signed on May 
9th. 
The letter then addressed the problems the parties were experiencing with developing the Property. 
It goes on to state: 
With so many issues still unanswered, I do not intend to 
permit Mr. Turner to release my $ 15,000 check until these 
issues are resolved and the property is rezoned. 
Otherwise, I could be left with a property that is 
improperly zoned for my purposes. 
I would therefore request that our Agreement be extended 
for an additional 120 days for no additional Earnest 
Money deposit. If this is acceptable, I will authorize Mr. 
Turner to hold my deposit until rezoning has been 
approved at which time I will then authorize in writing its 
release to you. 
* * * 
In my original letter to you dated April 6, 1990, I 
indicated that Overland Development Company would 
enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with you to develop 
the property . . . There is no need to enter into a Joint 
Venture Agreement until we have rezoned the property 
11 
and are preparing to get a construction loan on the hotel 
and/or restaurant/s. At that time it will be necessary to 
prepare the Joint Venture Agreement to obtain financing 
and pay you for the land. 
If you and Mrs. Brunetti agree to provide the extension 
requested and permit me to continue forward with the 
rezoning and construction financing as has been outlined 
above please sign the Acceptance below. 
R. 173 and 595-97; a true and correct copy of Overland's August 25,1990 letter is attached 
hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "F". 
14. This letter therefore notified Plaintiffs that Overland did not intend to follow through 
with the original deal and was suggesting a new deal. The August 25 letter also made it clear that 
new terms would need to be agreed to by the parties but would still included a joint venture between 
Plaintiffs and Overland. The Brunettis never signed the acceptance contained in this letter and no 
new agreement was reached. R. 608. In fact, on September 6, 1990, the Brunettis sent a letter to 
Overland which states in part: "So, we do not agree to the terms of Mr. Holman's August 25, 1990 
letter." R. 598. 
15. On September 6, 1990, Overland sent a letter to Plaintiffs making a new offer to 
purchase the Property as well as additional property for a total of approximately 11 acres. This letter 
states: 
I have requested Mr. Gil Turner to prepare a new Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement purchasing the entire 11 +/-
acres to supersede my original Offer to Purchase 5 +/-
acres. 
12 
The termination of the original offer and the inclusion of 
additional acreage will enable us to get the entire parcel 
rezoned. It will also eliminate the necessity of requiring 
you to joint venture the development with me. 
R. 599; a true and correct copy of Overland's September 6,1990 letter is attached hereto in 
the Addendum as Exhibit "G". 
16. September 6,1990 was the date on which the original offer terminated or had to be 
extended through the release of the original $15,000 deposit and the deposit of an additional non-
refundable $15,000 earnest money. This letter clearly shows that Overland is not seeking to extend 
the original offer and, by its terms, requests a new offer which includes additional acreage and does 
not include a joint venture agreement. Plaintiffs did not accept this proposal. R. 608. 
17. The parties never entered into a new agreement and Overland's attempt to purchase 
the Property terminated. R. 608. Thereafter, Turner, Plaintiffs' agent, returned Overland's original 
$15,000 check to Overland. R. 174. 
18. The trial court entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs finding that they were entitled 
to both the initial $15,000 earnest money, even though Overland had not requested an extension of 
time in which to close the construction loan on the Property and even though the construction loan 
had not closed. The trial court also found that Plaintiffs were entitled to the second $15,000, even 
though Overland had clearly not requested an extension of time in which to close the construction 
loan. In doing so the trial court refused to find that the joint venture was a condition precedent to 
these funds being owed to Plaintiffs. R. 417-18. 
13 
19. After trial, on December 17, 1996, the court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R. 758-63. The court found that Turner was Plaintiffs' agent and acted in their 
best interest. R. 759 and 761. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment due to 
numerous questions of material fact which should have been constured in Overland's favor. 
Therefore, Overland seeks to have this Court vacate the trial court's grant of Plaintiffs' Motion and 
remand this matter for trial, at least as to Plaintiffs' claim for the first $15,000 earnest money. 
The specific facts which the parties are in disagreement was whether the first $15,000 was 
non-refundable and forfeitable if the deal to develope the Property failed. The Agreement does not 
state that the first $15,000 is non-refundable and it states that it is only payable upon the closing of 
a construction loan or if Overland requested an additional period of time past the initial 120-day 
period to development the Property. There are also genuine issues of material fact as to whether the 
parties ever had a meeting of the minds on the joint venture agreement. The Agreement specifically 
states the parties will enter into a joint venture agreement to develope the Property. Plaintiffs have 
repeatedly stated that they did not intend to enter into a joint venture agreement and Overland has 
maintained that it would not have entered into the Agreement without the accompaning joint venture 
agreement. With regard to the second $15,000, the Agreement states that it is non-refundable only 
if Overland requests additional time past the initial 120-day period. Plaintiffs maintain that Overland 
did request additional time, but Overland maintains that it did not. 
14 
With regard to the earnest money payments, Plaintiffs were not entitled to any earnest money 
due to the fact that neither the sale of the Property nor a construction loan regarding the development 
of the Property closed. Further, an extension of the contract period was not requested nor granted 
and the Agreement does not state that the earnest money is to be forfeited. While Plaintiffs dispute 
Overland's position, this clearly creates a dispute in material fact, prohibiting the entery of summary 
judgment. 
The Agreement does not state that the earnest money will be forfeited in the event that a 
construction loan on the property does not close. While forfeitures are allowed by law, they are not 
favored. Therefore, where a forfeiture would result, this Court strictly construes the forefeiture 
provision. Since the contract does not provide for forfeiture, this court should not find a forfeiture. 
Plaintiffs repudiated the contract by not entering into the joint venture agreement. It is 
undisputed that Plaintiffs never intended to enter into a joint venture agreement. It is also undisputed 
that the contract called for a joint venture agreement. Since Plaintiffs never intended to into a joint 
venture agreement, there was either a failure of condition precendent to the Agreement or Plaintiffs' 
breached the Agreement prior to any alleged breach by Overland and are not entitled to any 
damages. -
Because questions of fact permiate regarding whether the parties ever had a meeting of mind 
on critical contract terms and the Agreement is at least ambiguous, the trial court erred in granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion. The facts show that a question of fact exists as to whether there was meeting of 
minds with regard to three critical terms: the joint venture in the development of the Property; when 
the first $15,000 earnest became payable; and when, if ever, the second $15,000 became payable. 
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Without a mutual understanding as to these terms there could be no contract. Whether the parties 
had a mutual understanding upon these terms is a question of fact, with Overland claiming that there 
was not a mutual understanding or at least claiming that they had an understanding which was 
different than Plaintiffs' understanding. Therefore, the trial court should not have granted summary 
judgment to Plaintiffs. kt 
Because the terms of the contract are so vague and ambiguous, the Court should vacate 
Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment and remand to the trial court to hear evidence regarding the parties' 
understanding on those terms. A contract is ambiguous if the words used to express the intention of 
the parties are insufficient so as the contract can be understood to encompass two or more plausable 
meanings. Here there are arguably two plausable meanings as to when the earnest money was to be 
paid; (1) Plaintiffs' proposed meaning and, (2) Defendant's position that the earnest money was only 
to be paid if the construction loan closed or if Overland requested an extension. * 
Overland believes that there exsists numerous questions of fact with regard to Plaintiffs 
motion prohibiting summary judgment for Plaintiffs on any issue. However, based upon the facts 
not in dispute and the documents, Overland maintains that the court can determine as a matter of law 
that Plaintiffs' were not entitled to summary judgment on the second $15,000 and that Overland was 
due to the fact that Overland did not request nor was it granted an extension beyond the initial 120-
day period. 
Overland respectfully requests this Court to vacate the Joint venture agreement's award of 
partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs, and remand this matter to the Joint venture agreement with 
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instructions to set it for trial on the breach of contract issue and limit Plaintiffs' potential damages 
to $15,000. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of review 
The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on the issue of breach of contract. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, this Court accords no deference to 
the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1993). This Court determines "only whether the trial court erred in applying the 
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact." State v. Ferre. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). With regard to the trial court's 
interpretation of the contract, this Court reviews the trial court's decision under a correctness 
standard giving the trial court's interpretation to no particular weight. Kimball v. Campbell. 699 
P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). 
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. 
Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). This gives parties a mechanism by which they can avoid 
unnecessary trials. Id. However, because a motion for summary judgment denies a litigant its day 
in court, the court must carefully scrutinize the documents submitted. Rich v. McGovern. 551 P.2d 
1266 (Utah 1976). If, after such scrutiny, the "evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact 
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which, if resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of 
law," the motion must be denied. Jackson v. Dabney. 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Where 
reasonable minds could differ, a genuine issue of fact exists. Id. In addition, all reasonable infereces 
must be drawn in favor of Overland. Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah 
App. 1989). Rather than following this rule, the trial court drew all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. 
Since reasonable minds could differ regarding the facts concerning Plaintiffs' Motion, which if 
resolved in Overland's favor would have entitled it to judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' Motion 
should have been denied. 
II. Summary of disputed facts. 
From the facts set forth above, there exist real and substantial differences between the parties 
as to the facts of this case. First, there are significant questions of fact regarding the first $15,000 
earnest money. Plaintiffs maintain that the first $15,000 was non-refundable and was forfeited when 
the deal to develop the Property failed. This position is not supported by the terms of the 
Agreement. The Agreement does not state that the first $15,000 is non-refundable or forfietable. 
It does state that the first $15,000 is only payable upon closing of a construction loan or if Overland 
requested an extension of time past the initial 120 day period to develop the Property. See, 
Exhibit A. Only under these circumstances did Overland believe it was obligated to release the first 
$15,000. Clearly, neither the sale of the Property nor the construction loan regarding the Property 
closed and it is Overland's contention, supported by its August 25 and September 6, 1990 letters 
(Exhibits F and G), that it never requested an extension of time to develop the Property. Therefore, 
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there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to the first $15,000, which should have 
precluded entry of summary judgment for Plaintiffs. 
Second, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the parties ever had a meeting 
of the minds on the joint venture agreement. The Agreement specifically states the parties will enter 
into a joint venture agreement to develop the Property. Plaintiffs have repeatedly stated that from 
the outset they had no intention of entering into such an agreement. Overland has consistently 
maintained that without the joint venture agreement, it would not have entered into the Agreement. 
Thus, there exists real and significant questions of fact as to whether there was ever a meeting of the 
minds sufficient to establish a binding contract. 
With regard to the second $15,000, there also exist genuine questions of fact as to Plaintiffs' 
theory. The Agreement states that the second $15,000 is non-refundable only if Overland requests 
additional time past the initial 120 day period. Plaintiffs maintain that Overland either did request 
additional time or was silent as to this issue, thus triggering the payment of the second $15,000. 
Overland maintains that it did not request additional time and in fact stated that the deal was off. 
Overland's position is supported by its August 25 and September 6, 1990 letters, which Plaintiffs 
admittedly received. Again, it is not an issue of which position is correct, it is sufficient to defeat 
Plaintiffs' Motion that there exist a genuine dispute as to these facts. 
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III. Plaintiffs were not entitled to any earnest money due 
to the fact that neither the sale of the Property nor a 
construction loan regarding the development of the 
Property closed, an extension of the contract period 
was not requested or granted and the Agreement does 
not state that the earnest money is to be forfeited. 
In this case, Overland gave a letter proposal to Plaintiffs dated April 6, 1990. On April 26, 
1990, Plaintiffs prepared a counteroffer. In Plaintiffs' counteroffer they stated: 
The initial contract term shall be for 90 days. Should additional 
time be required, the developer agrees to release the original 
$15,000 earnest money to seller and replace it with another 
$15,000 non-refundable earnest money for an additional 60 days." 
Overland reviewed Plaintiffs' counteroffer and, on May 7,1990, made a counteroffer of its own. In 
particular, Overland requested, and Plaintiffs agreed, that the initial contract period term be for 120 
days rather than 90 days. Therefore, Overland, on May 7,1990, delivered a $15,000 Overland check 
and a letter to Turner, Plaintiffs' agent. That letter stated that the check could not be deposited until 
written instructions were received from Overland. In addition, under the signed Agreement the 
initial $15,000 earnest money was payable only if Overland requested that the Agreement period be 
extended past 120 days or if a construction loan on the Property closed. Nowhere in the Agreement 
does it say that the earnest money will be forfeited if closing does not occur. Since Overland never 
requested an extension and a construction loan on the Property did not close, neither the initial 
$15,000 nor the non-refundable second $15,000 ever became payable to Plaintiffs. 
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A. Because the construction loan for the development of the 
Property did not close nor was a contract extension requested or 
granted, Plaintiffs never became entitled to the first $15,000 
earnest money. 
The Agreement states and it was Overland's understanding that the first $15,000 earnest 
money became payable only if a construction loan on the property closed or Overland requested an 
extension of the initial 120 day period. Interestingly, even Plaintiffs' Complaint agreed with 
Overland's understanding. The Complaint erroneously alleged that the $15,000 earnest money was 
to become non-refundable 90 days from May 7,1990. Complaint % 9 (R. 1-12). Plaintiffs' original 
theory was that because they were not told until after August 5, 1990 that the project could not go 
forward, they were entitled to the earnest money because there was an implied request for an 
extension of time. Complaint, f f 15, 16, and 17 (R. 1-12). However, it is undisputed that the 
actual period was 120 days, and that within that time there was no request for further time. R. 591-
93. To the contrary, Plaintiffs were notified that Overland did not want additional time under the 
existing deal, that Overland was not requesting additional time under the existing deal and that 
Overland would not authorize the deposit of the original $15,000. Exhibits F and G. Therefore, 
not only was the $15,000 not to be paid unless an extension of the initial contract period was 
requested or until the closing of the construction loan on the Property, but the initial contract term 
was 120 days rather than 90 days. See, Exhibit C. Plaintiffs' Complaint supports Overland's 
understanding of the Agreement, yet the trial court drew inferences in favor of the moving party and 
contrary to Overland's Affidavits. In making its ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion the trial court should 
have drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of Overland. Beehive Brick. 780 P.2d 827. 
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Prior to the expiration of the original 120 day period, Overland determined that Salt Lake 
City would not permit the development which had been anticipated and that therefore, the 
contemplated transaction would not move forward. On August 25, 1990, Overland wrote to the 
Brunettis and informed them of City requirements. Overland informed the Brunettis that until the 
city rezoned the Property, it would not authorize the depositing of the $15,000.00. The August 25th 
letter is clear that Overland is asking for a new arrangement and it is not going to go forward with 
the Property purchase. Further, in the September 6, 1990 letter, Overland clearly states that it is 
preparing a new agreement to "supersede" the original Agreement. This is the date, based on the 120 
day contract period, on which Overland had to request an extension and deposit the additional 
$15,000 sum, if it wanted the Agreement to remain binding. Overland clearly stated that it was only 
willing to move forward with the Property under new terms which included an additional 6 acres of 
land. The Brunettis responded on the same day stating that they were not interested in selling the 
Property under the new terms. Therefore, under the facts as alleged by Overland, no later than 
September 6, 1990, the deal was off and Plaintiffs were not entitled to the first $15,000. 
Also, apparently, Plaintiffs' agent, Turner, believed that the deal was off. He returned the 
original $15,000 earnest money to Overland. The trial court held that Turner, as Plaintiffs' agent, 
had represented their best interest. Since Turner was Plaintiffs' agent representing their best interests 
and he returned the original $15,000 earnest money to Overland, signifying that the deal was off, 
it is difficult to see how Plaintiffs can now maintain that they were entitled to any earnest money. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment regarding the first $15,000 and, 
arguably, Overland was. 
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While arguably that Overland was entitled to summary judgment finding that the first 
$15,000 never became due and payable, at a minimum it is clear, based upon the facts as alleged and 
supported by Overland, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Plaintiffs ever became entitled 
to the first $15,000, thus giving rise to genuine issues of material facts. If these issues of material 
fact were resolved in Overland's favor, it would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the issue of their entitlement to the 
first $15,000. Jackson, 645 P.2d 615. 
B. Because Overland never requested an extension to the original 
120 day period. Plaintiffs were not entitled to the second $15,000 
earnest money. 
With regard to the additional $15,000, this amount was due only if Overland requested an 
extension beyond the initial 120 day contact period. R. 174. Plaintiffs claimed that Overland either 
requested additional time or was silent, thus inferring a need for additional time. R. 120-23,327-28 
and 655-56. On the other hand, it was Holman's testimony, supported by his August 25, 1990 
(Exhibit F) and September 6,1990 (Exhibit G) letters, that Overland did not request an extension 
past that period. Clearly the parties testimony is at odds and where there is a disputed material fact, 
summary judgment is not appropriate. Therefore, at a minimum, Plaintiffs are not entitled to partial 
summary judgment on the second $ 15,000. 
Originally, Plaintiffs agreed with Overland's interpretation regarding the second $15,000 
earnest money. In their Compliant, Plaintiffs stated that the original period was for 90 days, rather 
than the now established 120 days. The Complaint then states: 
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16. The Earnest Money Agreement provided an additional 60-day option 
for exclusive rights to the Property. By the terms of the Earnest Money 
Agreement, Holman and/or Overland would be required to release the 
initial $15,000 earnest money deposit to the Brunettis, and deposit an 
additional $15,000 of earnest money in Turner's trust account for 
Brunettis. 
17. Despite expiration of the 90-day period, Overland . . . continued to 
operate as though [it] possessed exclusive rights to the Property, and on 
September 7, 1990, thirty two days after expiration of the option period, 
formally requested additional time to complete the sale. 
18. By exercising the right for additional time under the Earnest Money 
Agreement. Overland . . . became obligated to deposit... an additional 
$15.000 for the additional period... . 
R. 1-12 (emphasis added). Clearly, as originally plead by Plaintiffs, they believed that the option 
to extend the period was based upon either Overland's acts or stated desire, not upon some showing 
of "need" sufficient to Plaintiffs to justify extending the period. 
Since the deal was dead prior to September 6,1996, there was no request for additional time 
and Overland should be granted summary judgment finding that Plaintiff never was entitled to the 
second $15,000 earnest money. Alternatively, it is apparent that if the Court grants any credence 
to Plaintiffs' interpretation of the contract, there exist significant questions of material fact precluding 
summary judgment for Plaintiffs on this issue. 
C. The Agreement does not state that the earnest money will be 
forfeited in the event a construction loan on the Property does not 
•••' i ,'.,• close. .• •••:...•-•'• "•-•••*'• 
Plaintiffs would have the court believe that the Agreement provides for forfeiture of the 
earnest money if a construction loan on the Property does not close. However, a careful review of 
the final Agreement dispels this myth. Nowhere within that document does it state that the earnest 
24 
money will be forfeited if a construction loan on the Property does not close. While forfeitures are 
allowed by law, they are not favored. Russell v. Park Citv Utah Corp.. 548 P.2d 889 (Utah 1976), 
Cert. Denied. 429 U.S. 860 (1977). Therefore, where a forfeiture would result, this Court strictly 
construes the forfeiture provision. Id. at 891. 
In this case, when Plaintiffs wanted a forfeiture to occur they knew how to provide for one. 
In drafting their counteroffer they stated that the second $15,000 would be non-refundable. The 
same term was not applied to the first $15,000. Also, neither Turner nor Plaintiff ever cashed or 
deposited the first $15,000 check. This is hardly the action one would expect a party to take if a 
payment was non-refundable and immediately forfeited. It is clear in construing the language chosen 
by Plaintiffs, payment of the first $15,000 is only required if a construction loan closes or Overland 
requests an extension, neither of which happened. Therefore, there should be no forfeiture of the 
first or second $15,000. 
IV. Plaintiffs repudiated the contract by not entering into 
the joint venture agreement, 
Overland's offer clearly states that within two weeks of acceptance of the Agreement the 
parties will enter into a separate joint venture agreement. Plaintiffs' counter offer does not address 
this term of the offer and Plaintiffs indicated their acceptance of this term by signing the Agreement 
on May 9, 1990. R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child. 247 P.2d 817, 819 (Utah 1952) (where a party 
unconditionally accepts an offer, a binding contract is made). It is undisputed that the parties never 
entered into the joint venture agreement. In fact, Plaintiffs testified in their depositions that they 
never intended to joint venture the development of the Property and would not have entered into a 
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joint venture agreement with Overland. Thus, there was either a failure of a condition precedent to 
the Agreement2 or Plaintiffs breached the Agreement prior to any alleged breach by Overland and 
are not entitled to any damages. 
In an attempt to avoid this problem, Plaintiffs have claimed that Overland waived the joint 
venture requirement in its August 25, 1990 letter. But, in fact, this is further evidence that the 
August 25,1990 letter is proposing a new deal. The joint venture was required of Plaintiffs and the 
fact that they never intended to act is a repudiation of the Agreement making it impossible for 
Overland to waive—since Plaintiffs had already breached the Agreement. Cobabe v. Stanger. 844 
P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992) (repudiation of a contract allows the other party to sue for breach of 
contract). In addition, waiver, an intentional relinquishment of a known right, is very fact specific 
and is usually not a proper issue for resolution by summary judgment. American Falls Canal Sec. 
Co. v. American S. & L. Assn.. 775 P.2d 412, 415 (Utah 1989). 
More importantly, by August 25, 1990, it was apparent that the development would not go 
forward as planned. The August 25, 1990 letter was a new offer. As with the previous offer, part 
of this new offer included a joint venture whereby Plaintiffs would contribute the Property in 
exchange for a return on their investment at closing. Plaintiffs never accepted this new offer and the 
original deal terminated. 
2
 A condition precedent is a provision within the contract which if not fulfilled excuses performance. Creer 
v. Thurman. 581 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978). If the joint venture agreement is a condition precedent to the Agreement, 
then the court must inquire into the intent of the parties in light of all the circumstances when they executed the 
agreement. Id- This clearly makes the issue of a condition precedent a factual question not subject to summary 
judgment. 
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Because Plaintiffs repudiated the contract by not entering into the joint venture agreement, 
they were not entitled to partial summary judgment against Overland. If anything, Overland was 
entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims due to their prior breach of contract or 
the failure of a condition precedent. However, at a minimum there exists questions of fact regarding 
the joint venture agreement precluding summary judgment. 
V. Because questions of fact permeate the case regarding 
whether the parties ever had a meeting of the minds on 
critical contract terms and the Agreement is at least 
ambiguous, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. 
A. The facts show that a question of fact exists as to 
whether there was a meeting of the minds with regard 
to critical terms of the contract. 
Overland has maintained throughout this litigation that there was never a meeting of the 
minds on either the joint venture or the earnest money provisions of the Agreement. For that reason, 
Plaintiffs' Motion should have originally been rejected. Since the date of Plaintiffs' Motion, the facts 
have been more fully fleshed out, further supporting Overland's position that there was never a 
meeting of the minds.3 In order for a contract to be binding, there must be an agreement between 
the parties to such critical terms which are sufficiently set forth as to allow the contract to be 
enforced. Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton. 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah App. 1993). Here, it 
is clear that questions of fact predominate as to whether the parties ever had a meeting of the minds 
on three critical terms; the joint venture in the development of the Property, when the first $15,000 
3
 For example, at the trial Joseph Brunetti made it clear that the Brunettis never intended to enter into a joint 
venture agreement with Overland (R. 944-45). 
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earnest money became payable; and when, if ever, the second $15,000 became payable. Without 
a mutual understanding as to these terms there could be no contract. 
Overland's original offer contains two important provisions with which the Plaintiffs 
apparently, did not agree. The first is the joint venture agreement between Plaintiffs and Overland 
to develop the Property. The offer states: 
a. Overland would then enter into a joint venture agreement with the 
land owner, within two weeks, to develop the property. 
b. The benefit of a joint venture relationship of this type is that it 
enables the developer to use its limited resources on the development 
of the property instead of the purchase of the land. This also reduces 
some of the risk of the developer and gives assurance that the project 
can be consummated before the expiration of the agreement. 
The Contract clearly requires a joint venture agreement. In his affidavit, Kenneth Holman stated that 
he intended to enter into a joint venture agreement with Plaintiffs and that he would not have agreed 
to the deal if it did not include a joint venture. On the other hand, Plaintiffs stated at trial that they 
would not have entered into the deal if they had been "aware" that it included a joint venture 
agreement (since the provision for a joint venture appears in the offer, one wonders how the 
Plaintiffs could not have been aware that this was part and parcel of the Agreement). Clearly there 
was not a meeting of the minds on this critical provision and thus a contract was not effectuated. 
Further, there was never a meeting of the minds as to what terms the joint venture agreement would 
contain. Therefore, at a minimum, a question of fact exists as to what each party's understanding 
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was regarding the joint venture agreement. Strand v. Cranney. 607 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 1980) 
(whether a joint venture exists is usually a question of fact). 
Although there are disputes and arguments about Plaintiffs' contentions, there can be no 
dispute or question that Plaintiffs have not established their contentions so as to be entitled to 
summary judgment. The Brunettis were to be involved in developing the Property to the extent they 
would contribute the land up front in exchange for a payment if a construction loan was obtained by 
Overland. This was an integral part of the parties' Agreement and, based upon the parties' testimony, 
there was never a meeting of the minds on this issue, or at least there is a question of fact as to 
whether there was a meeting of the minds. Because there is a question of material fact on whether 
the parties ever had a meeting of the minds regarding the joint venture, the trial court's ruling 
granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs was error. 
The other important provision on which the parties did not reach a mutual understanding was 
under what circumstances the earnest money became due and payable. Overland's original offer of 
April 6, 1990 states in pertinent part as follows: 
a. A $15,000.00 earnest money would be deposited in an independent 
trust account to be credited to the purchase price at the time of closing 
with the balance being paid from the proceeds of the construction 
loan, (emphasis added) 
b. Overland, by separate agreement, would agree to pay the land owner 
the agreed upon price, in cash, at the closing of the construction loan. 
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c. It is estimated that the construction loan and all approvals can be 
obtained within 120 to 180 days, however, if additional time is 
needed the developer agrees to release the original $15,000.00 earnest 
money to the land owner and to deposit an additional $15,000.00 
non-refundable earnest money for an additional extension of 180 
days, (emphasis added) 
See, Exhibit A. It is clear from Overland's initial offer that the original $15,000.00 gets paid only 
"at the time of closing" of the construction loan or if "additional time is needed past the 120 days." 
Overland was unwilling to proceed because of difficulties with the zoning applicable to the Property. 
See, Exhibits F and G. Therefore, on August 25, 1990, towards the end of the initial contract 
period, Overland proposed an entirely different transaction. This offer included additional time to 
complete the transaction without the release of the original earnest money and extending the time 
in which the parties were to enter into the joint venture agreement. Further, on September 6, 1990, 
the date on which the extension had to be requested, Overland explicitly stated that the original 
agreement was terminated and proposed an offer on the Brunettis' entire 11 acres. See, Exhibit G. 
Neither the August 25 or September 6, 1990 offer was accepted. (R. 608). 
Plaintiffs' counteroffer raised the price to $895,000 and stated that the initial contract term 
shall be for 90 days. This was subsequently modified by Overland's counteroffer, which was 
accepted by Plaintiffs, to provide for an initial contract term of 120 days. Furthermore, in the 
counteroffer Plaintiffs stated: "Should additional time be required the developer agrees to release 
the original $15,000.00 earnest money to seller and replace it with another $15,000 non-refundable 
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earnest money for an additional 60 days." Again, the language shows that both the initial $15,000 
and the subsequent $15,000 would be released to Plaintiffs only if the construction loan on the 
Property closed or if Overland requested an extension beyond the 120 day initial period. 
Apparently, Plaintiffs believed that they were entitled to the first $ 15,000 if Overland did not 
close the purchase within 120 days. This is in direct contravention with language of the Agreement 
and the understanding of Overland. In addition, Plaintiffs' position is not supported by the 
documents. There is no place in Exhibits A, B, or C which states that the original $15,000 is non-
refundable or that it gets forfeited if there is not a closing within 120 days. Clearly, had the parties 
wanted the original $15,000 to be non-refundable they would have said so as they had done with the 
second potential $15,000 earnest money payment. 
Plaintiffs are attempting to have the court write into the agreement a clause which is not 
present, i.e., that the first $15,000 is "non-refundable" and that it be forfeited. Since the term "non-
refundable" does not appear anywhere with respect to the initial $15,000, the Court should not 
rewrite the Agreement to supply this term. Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerican, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743 (Utah 1982). To do so would wrongly make a better deal for Plaintiffs than they made for 
themselves. Rio Algen Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1970). Plaintiffs ask the court to 
ignore the condition that they will be paid only when there is a construction loan or if Overland 
requested an extension to the initial period. However, it is clear that none of these events occurred. 
Regardless, it shows that there was not a meeting of the minds on the critical element of when 
payment of the earnest money was to be made. In such a case, the trial court should find that there 
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was no contract or hear evidence as to whether the parties had a mutual understanding on the terms 
of the Agreement. 
B. Because the terms of the Contract are so vague and 
ambiguous, this Court should vacate Plaintiffs1 
Summary Judgment and remand to the trial court to 
hear evidence regarding the parties' understanding on 
those terms. 
At a minimum, the Agreement between the parties is ambiguous. A contract is ambiguous 
if the words used to express the intention of the parties are insufficient so as the contract can be 
understood to encompass two or more plausible meanings. C.J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923 
(Utah App. 1988). Here theie are arguably two plausible meanings as to when the earnest money 
was to be paid; (1) Plaintiffs' proposed meaning and, (2) Defendants' position that the earnest money 
was only to be paid if the construction loan closed or Overland requested an extension. If the 
Agreement cannot be resolved by an objective and reasonable interpretation, a court must resort to 
extrinsic evidence. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); Utah Vallev Bank 
v. Tannex 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). This includes parol evidence as to the parties' intentions 
under the Agreement. Id. 
Here, based upon the Holman Affidavit, Overland's intention was that the original $15,000 
would not be payable unless one of two things happen: (1) either Overland requested an extension 
beyond the initial 120 day contract period; or (2) the construction loan on the Property closed. 
R. 174. Overland never requested an extension past the 120 day period and the construction loan 
did not close. Therefore, based upon the parol testimony of Holman, the original $15,000 never 
became payable to Plaintiffs. R. 173. Where extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine the terms 
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of an agreement, there exists a question of fact for determination by the finder of fact after a trial. 
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England. Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co.. 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). 
With regard to the additional $15,000, this amount was due only if Overland requested an 
extension beyond the initial 120 day Contact period. R. 174. It is Holman's testimony, supported 
by his August 25, 1990 and September 6, 1990 letters, that Overland did not request an extension 
past that period. Plaintiffs dispute this fact. Where there is a disputed material fact, summary 
judgment is not appropriate. Therefore, at least concerning the additional $15,000, Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to partial summary judgment. However, as addressed below, Overland requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and require 
the trial court to hear evidence regarding the terms of the Agreement, but limit Plaintiffs' potential 
damages to the first $15,000. 
VI. This Court should enter summary judgment for Overland 
regarding the second $15,000. 
Overland believes that there exists numerous questions of fact with regard to Plaintiffs' 
Motion prohibiting summary judgment for Plaintiffs on any issue. However, based upon those facts 
not in dispute and the documents, especially Overland's August 25, 1990 and September 6, 1990 
letters, Overland maintains that the Court can determine as a matter of law that Plaintiffs were not 
entitled to summary judgment on the second $15,000 and that Overland was. Christensen v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 443 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1968). This is true whether or not Overland has 
previously moved for summary judgment on this issue. Id.; Security Title Co. v. Pay less Builders 
33 
Supply. 407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965) (where there are no true issues of material fact, a court may grant 
summary judgment without formal advanced notice). 
In this case there are no disputed material facts as to whether Plaintiffs repudiated the 
contract by not intending to joint venture the development of the Property. Also there is no dispute 
that under the terms of the agreement as written, Overland never requested, nor was it granted, an 
extension beyond the 120-day period. It is clear from Overland's August 25 and September 6, 1990 
letters that Overland had determined not to go forward with the development of the Property and had 
terminated the deal. Therefore, under no circumstances did Plaintiffs become entitled to the second 
$15,000. 
There is no question of material facts regarding the second $15,000 earnest money and that 
Plaintiffs never became entitled to this sum as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court may reverse the 
trial court's decision as to the second $15,000 earnes money and grant summary judgment to 
Overland, limiting Plaintiffs' damages to a maximum of $15,000. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Overland respectfully requests that the Court vacate the trial 
court's grant of partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs and remand this case for a trial on the merits 
due to the fact that material questions of fact exist, precluding a grant of summary judgment. 
Overland also requests that this Court direct the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of 
Overland limiting Plaintiffs' potential damages to the first $15,000. 
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Richard A. Rappapo^ 
Kevin J. Fife 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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^flSBk Development Company 
April 6, 1990 
Gil Turner 
Turner Co* Real Estate 
P.O. Box 2264 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Dear Mr. Turner: 
Overland Development Company would like to purchase the 5.33 (+ or -) 
acres, Parcel No. 38019-0000, located on North Temple west of Redwood 
Road. The terms of the purchase are slightly different from the normal 
Earnest Money Agreement that is presented, however, we have found our 
approach to be very sound and profitable for both the landowner and the 
developer* Over the past 6 years we have developed over^$30 million of 
real estate using this method. Our proposal is as follows: 
Overland Development Company would agree to purchase the property for an 
agreed price of $850,000. Included an the purchase price is the 
assignment of the private club license and purchase of the existing 
building, excluding any inventory. A $15,000 earnest money would be 
deposited in an independent trust account to be credited to the purchase 
price at the time of closing with the balance being paid from the 
proceeds of the construction loanl Overland would then enter into a 
joint venture agreement with the landowner i within two weeks, to develop 
the property^ It would be Overlandfs responsibility to pay for all the 
development and approval costs, including: a feasibility study; an 
appraisal; environmental studies; engineering drawings; architectural 
drawings; city approvals; and all other costs incident to the development 
of the property for the purpose of building a hotel and restaurant/club* 
The landowner would agree to permit Overland Development Company\ or 
another entity to which Overland assigns its interest, to represent to 
the City and to lending institutions that the land has been contributed 
to the partnership. This enables Overland to establish an equity 
position in the deal to comply with the lending institutions 
requirements. 
Overland/by separate agreement, would agree to pay the landowner the 
agreed upon price, in cash, at the closing of the construction loan. 
The benefit of a joint venture relationship of this type is that it 
enables the developer to use it's limited resources on the development of 
the property instead of the purchase of the land. This also reduces some 
of the risk of the developer and gives assurance that the project can be 
consummated before the expiration of the agreement. 
0 C C 5 ? 7 
230 E- Broadway • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 • (801)355-1111 • FAX(8011486-?175 
txfllBIT_£t 
Under the conventional method of purchasing a property, the landowner, 
usually, would be required to accept an earnest money agreement which had 
enough contingencies in the agreement to insure that the developer could 
develop the property. In most cases, the length of time to close the 
deal would b^ about the same* I t is estimated that the construction loan 
and a l l approvals can be obtained within 120 to 180 days, however, if 
additional time i s needed the developer agrees to release the original 
$15,000 earnest money to the landowner and to deposit an additional 
$15,000 nonrefundable earnest money for an additional extension of 180 
days. I t i s the intention o£ the developer to proceed with the 
development as rapidly as possible. Any delays in the process will 
likely be due to delays in obtaining City approvals* 
Kenneth T- Holman 
President 
Accepted: 
V „ _ Date: 
X-s £>u,Bcn£cs- l a Tfchose. CHA#J<£><5S, X ^ T K I 
C C ? U / O T & ^ O ^ S ' 2 - T>V*"Ct> A-/D(£c:C ^-C^ t ^ ^ o , 
6 < U r * 
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CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
--0O0--




GILBERT R. TURNER, 
KENNETH T. HOLMAN, and 
OVERLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 93090886 
DEPOSITION OF 
JOSEPH BRUNETTI 
Judge Dennis Frederick 
--0O0--
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th day of 
May, 1993, the deposition of JOSEPH BRUNETTI was taken 
at the instance and request of RICHARD A. RAPPAPORT at 
the offices of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, 525 East 100 
South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah, before ANNI 
HARMON, a Registered Professional Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the State of Utah. 
Reported By: ANNI HARMON, RPR,CSR 
Associated Professional Reporters EXHIBIT^ 
10 West Broadway / Suite 300 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Phone (801) 322-3441 
for Overland Management and Realty Company 
Incorporated." 
Q. BY MR. RAPPAPORT: You may not have paid 
attention to it, but in fact, it was written on there 
right from the beginning. Is that true? 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Turner that you would 
not enter into a joint venture agreement with Overland 
Development? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that? 
A. I can't remember at this time. All I wanted 
was my money. I wasn't going to be in joint venture 
with them. 
Q. Was that sometime during the summer of 1990? 
A. It could have been. Mr. Turner came over to 
my house a lot. 
Q. We had that undated letter that you signed. 
I'm not sure if it's already an exhibit. 
(Deposition Exhibit No. 22 
marked for identification.) 
Q. BY MR. RAPPAPORT: Let me hand you what has 
been marked as Exhibit 22. Are you familiar with that 
letter? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
--0O0--
JOSEPH R. and FLORENCE : 
BRUNETTI, : 
: Case No. 93090886 
Plaintiffs, : 
: DEPOSITION OF 
vs. : 
: FLORENCE BRUNETTI 
GILBERT R. TURNER, : 
KENNETH T. HOLMAN, and : Judge Moffatt 
OVERLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., : 
Defendants. 
--0O0--
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of May, 
1994, the deposition of FLORENCE BRUNETTI was taken at 
the instance and request of RICHARD A. RAPPAPORT at the 
offices of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, 525 East 100 South, 
Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah, before ANNI HARMON, a 
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah. 
Reported By: ANNI HARMON, RPR,CSR 
Associated Professional ReporterC V U I D I T 
10 Wa» Droadww •' Quito 000 / Calfc Lolto Ctto, Utah 84101 J\ Y\ \ f l [ , 
Phone (801) 322-3441 
1 A. Not that I remember. 
2 Q. Did you hear your husband's prior testimony 
3 that he did not want to sign such an agreement? 
4 MR. STEFFENSEN: Objection. 
5 Mischaracterization. He said he would not subordinate 
6 the property, which is different. 
7 MR. RAPPAPORT: I can find it in the 
8 deposition if you want. 
9 MR. STEFFENSEN: Okay. I think it's a 
10 mischaracterization. 
11 MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm not talking about what 
12 he said today. 
13 MR. STEFFENSEN: I think before it's the 
14 same thing. 
15 Q. BY MR. RAPPAPORT: Had you been willing to 
16 sign a joint venture agreement with Overland? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Was it your understanding that 
19 Gilbert Turner was supposed to be yours and your 
20 husband's agent? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 MR. STEFFENSEN: Objection. Vague and 
23 ambiguous. Agent? 
24 Q. BY MR. RAPPAPORT: Was he supposed to be the 
25 J real estate agent? 
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ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This A D D E N O U M / C O U N T E R OFFER constitutes: (^ ) a COUNTER OFFER ( } an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES A G R E E M E N T (THE AGREEMENT) dated th* isr^ day of H p F ? * — 19 jELr?. between 
Q\J<L£i-Artl> ~"bc^. Co. buyer(s).and J — W ^ - * * • S- ^ ^ ^ UU' ~*«^Herts)." 
covering real property described as follows: 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
W < - I C i ^ H s A A J P > '" f J f v J D j T j Q / J S i Or T^iL l - e T T C / 2 . * " D / r r c , 0 
A p P T v - 6 ? , 1 <5,f>o , / \ f P C /A re d p T / i R C t ^ J T H T ht-C 
a A " T f r t L S s ^ X " T ^ ^ ^ f c ? / J T j ? / c r T £ , / g > / \ A S M>4 C I ^ ^ £ -
U ^ J T w \ Z ^ N / J T H ^ I ^  , O ^ O M ^ f J jc 's l F U ^ ^ £ b C C , 
All other terms of T H E A G R E E M E N T shall remain.lhe same. ( ) Seller ( ^^Buyer shalhhave until ^ ; **& ( A . M . / ^ M ) 
^ ~ ° ^ *\§JzL2.\Q accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse. 
Oate f l L - 1 2-6> " ^ O
 r Signature of (v^jSeller ( ) Buyer ^ _^— 
Time ^ ^ > ^ (fJXvPKA) - / Q ^ j j J \ ' / J ^ l U V u ^ 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER-REJECTION 
Check One 
( ) t hereby A C C E P T the foregoing on the terms specified above. 
{ ) I hereby A C C E P T the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum. 
Signature Signature Oate Time 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( J I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing ail signatures. 
Signature of Buyer(s) Date Signature of Seller(s) Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on . ^
 (- /> 
b v v i) 
19. , by Certified Mai l and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. 
Sent by 
This form has t>«en approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission. -EXHIBIT. D 
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ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFF 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGR 
This A D D E N D U M / C O U N T E R OFFER constitutes: ( v f a COUNTER OFFER ( ) an A D D E N D U M to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the 6 ? T U .
 d a y o f R-pgL-C C 1Q °iO ?. between. 
Ooe^LA^n "beu. da. „buyer (s),and Jo^=pU ~R. 4 t-Lo£.&jg£ u>. 5 ^ ^ 
covering real property described as follows: 
iT .33 H-'ov. —) /4o&eS . TAX A^r <^S)B.S pAgcef— SJQ. 
O f t - 3 4 - - 3 S t - £> l^ 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
\vrts TeRr- ts /A/Qj^  G^/Qi>x-ncOAJ& OF Tfo= t-grra^. T W & P 
Ap&x<- 6?f >q.°io . A^e Aer^prxJaLe \AJ-CTH T>M= 
l^) T r t e . T t e J C £ :SHAt-<- ~B>& 893",000 
2^ T i r s X ^ x i - r x A i - C Q O T ^ A C T ~ T ^ / A S<4A<-C ' fee 
"Pag. ^£r<s3ocgig^sa> ~Tm* ~ " h e u £ i o p e / 3 - . >^g^<5=^ ~TQ c^jb: 
All other terms of T H E AGREEMENT shall remain the same. ( ) Seller ( ^ j B u y e r shall have until ^ : < * & ( A . M . ^ M ? ) 
^ 3<£>
 > \t^^jQ t 0 accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse. 
Date ^f" ~ 2-G> — ^ O Signature of ( v f s e l l e r ( ) Buyer ^j _ _ - ~ -
Time ^ ' ^ ^ y p . M . ) S CLsUAfaj. J^' fj/Uttotik 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER/REJECTION 
Check One 
( v j [^ l d f e f e y" A C-G^B^4^4af jaCiOing on the terms specified above. 
( Q */frecfoy AC^EgX44y^or^o / j j i g s ^pBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum ) U^er t fby^ACQERj^^^orQa^g^Sy   t  ti    t  tt  . 
( ) I 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I a c k n o w l e d g e rece ip t of a f inal c o p y of the foregoing bearingf all s ignatures. 
Signature of Buyer(s) Date A Sifriature ol Seller(s) Oate 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregomg bearing approbate signatures to be mailed on 
19 . by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Suyer. 
Sent by _ _
 : 




August 25, 1990 
Joseph R. Brunett i 
Dear Mr. Brune t t i : 
On May 9, 1990 you and your wife, Florence, accepted an offer I made to 
purchase 5 (+ or -) acres located on North Temple near Redwood Road for 
$895,000. The Agreement gave me 120 days to complete the s a l e . If I 
needed addi t ional time I would be required to re lease the or ig inal 
$15,000 Earnest Money deposit to you and pay an addit ional $15,000 
non-refundable Earnest Money for an addi t ional :60 day extension^ 
September 6, 1990 wi l l be the 120th day since our Agreement was signed on 
May 9th. 
So far I have spent considerable time and money trying to get Salt Lake 
City to rezone the property from R-6 to C-l. Gil Turner and I have met 
with members of the Planning Commission on four separate occasions. Two 
of those meetings have been with the Development Coordination Committee. 
Because the Committee wil l not rezone a property without a specif ic 
development project in mind I have had my a rch i tec t design a conceptual 
s i t e showing two res taurant pads and a hote l . After meeting with the 
Development Coordination Committee for the second time they ask me to 
completely rev ise the conceptual plan. They wanted wider s t r e e t s for 
Duder and Ger t ie . They wanted to eliminate any access into the property 
from Redwood Road to Gertie and they wanted Duder to dead end instead of 
tying into New Star Road. Additionally they requested changes in the 
height of bui ldings and in the parking layout and landscaping schemes. 
Besides the . t ime delays we have experienced in dealing with the City 
there have been some other major issues to resolve. In order to enter 
the proper ty , with the elimination of access from Gert ie , we need a l e f t 
hand turn lane to replace the island on North Temple. Although the S t a t e 
has expressed a wil l ingness to provide a l e f t hand turn lane into the 
property I w i l l need to have an engineer design the turn lane and submit 
i t to the Utah Department of Transportation for approval. 
There are o ther issues that s t i l l need to be addressed before we can 
f i n a l i z e bur Agreement. I t i s l ikely that there i s soi l contamination on 
the east s ide of your property because of i t s proximity to the Cash Saver 
A c r ~ r s 
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gas station. I need to have a soil test run to determine if this is the 
case. If it is I still intend to buy the property at the agreed price 
but it will require that I move one of the restaurant pad sites and maybe 
redesing the hotel layout. 
With so many issues still unanswered I do not intend to permit Mr. Turner 
to release my $15,000 check until these issues are resolved and the 
property is rezoned. Otherwise I could be left with a property that is 
improperly zoned for my purposes. 
I would therefore request that our Agreement be extended for an 
additional 120 days for no additional Earnest Money deposit; If this is 
acceptable I will authorize Mr. Turner to hold my deposit until the 
rezoning has been approved at which time I will then authorize in writing 
its release to you. 
I appreciate your patience and apologize for the delay, I can't believe 
how incredibly slow the City is rezoning property! Regardless of the 
City's delays I am moving forward as fast as I can on all the other 
issues. It appears that I have tentatively lined up an additional equity 
partner to joint venture the development of the hotel. I have also 
received verbal approval from Hampton Inn regarding the acquisition of 
the Franchise rights for the location, Mr. Turner and I have also 
secured two very strong national restaurant chains who are now going 
through their review and approval process. 
I apologize for the delay. A lot of the blame rests with the City and 
their inability to move faster on rezoning the property. I believe that 
even if another developer were found to replace me that they would have 
to go through the same process and frustrations of rezoning the property 
before they would agree to buy it. 
In my original letter to you dated April 6, 1990, I indicated that 
Overland Development Company would enter into a Joint Venture Agreement 
with you to develop the property. The purpose of this Agreement was not 
to get you involved in our development but merely as a .way of permitting 
Overland to represent that it was also an owner of the property for 
purposes of getting the property rezoned and for financing the restaurant 
and hotel developments. At this stage you have signed a letter to the 
City indicating that I can represent you in getting the property 
rezoned. There is no need to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement until 
we have rezoned the property and are preparing to get a construction loan 
on the hotel and/or restaurant/s. At that time it will be necessary to 
prepare the Joint Venture Agreement to obtain the financing and pay you 
for the land. 
o c c r c e 
If you and Mrs. Brunetti agree to provide the extension requested above 
and to permit me to continue forward with the rezoning and construction 
financing as has been outlined above please sign the acceptance below. 
Sincerely.,. 




Joseph R. Brunet t i Florence W. Brunetti 
Date Date 




September 6, 1990 
Joseph R. § Florence W. Brunetti 
Dear Mr. $ Mrs, Brunetti 
Re: Offer to Purchase 5 •/- acres 
on North Temple near Redwood Rd 
I have requested Mr. Gil Turner to prepare a new Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement purchasing the entire 11 +/- acres to supercede my original 
Offer to Purchase 5 +/- acres. 
The termination of the original offer and the inclusion of the additional 
acreage will enable us to get the entire parcel rezoned. It will also 
eliminate the necessity of requiring you to joint venture the development 
with me, 
I intend to move forward on the rezoning as fast as possible.. There are 
several zoning requirements that the planning commission stipulated in 
its Preliminary Project Review (Petition 400-655 - Holman/Turner 
[Brunetti] Request to rezone property at 1750 West North Temple from 
Residential fTR-6" to Commercial flC-l,f). My architect is moving forward 
to make the necessary changes. 
As I progress through the zoning process I would welcome any suggestions 
you may have. 
Sincerely, 
Kenneth T. Holman 
President 
cc: Gil Turner 
u i; I *_<• V • ' 
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